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Abstract
Background: Thousands of different microorganisms affect the health, safety, and economic
stability of populations. Many different medical and governmental organizations have created lists
of the pathogenic microorganisms relevant to their missions; however, the nomenclature for
biological agents on these lists and pathogens described in the literature is inexact. This ambiguity
can be a significant block to effective communication among the diverse communities that must deal
with epidemics or bioterrorist attacks.
Results: We have developed a database known as the Microbial Rosetta Stone. The database
relates microorganism names, taxonomic classifications, diseases, specific detection and treatment
protocols, and relevant literature. The database structure facilitates linkage to public genomic
databases. This paper focuses on the information in the database for pathogens that impact global
public health, emerging infectious organisms, and bioterrorist threat agents.
Conclusion: The Microbial Rosetta Stone is available at http://www.microbialrosettastone.com/.
The database provides public access to up-to-date taxonomic classifications of organisms that cause
human diseases, improves the consistency of nomenclature in disease reporting, and provides
useful links between different public genomic and public health databases.
Background
Thousands of different microorganisms affect the health
and safety of the world's populations of humans, animals,
and plants. Infectious microorganisms include species of
bacteria, viruses, fungi, and protozoa. Many different
medical and governmental organizations have created
lists of the pathogenic microorganisms most relevant to
their missions. For example, the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) maintains an ever-changing
list of notifiable diseases, the National Institute of Allergy
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and Infectious Disease (NIAID) lists agents with potential
for use in bioterrorist attacks, and the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) maintains a list of crit-
ical human pathogens. Unfortunately, the nomenclature
for biological agents on these lists and pathogens
described in the literature is imprecise. Organisms are
often referred to using common names, alternative spell-
ings, or out-dated or alternative names. Sometimes a dis-
ease rather than a particular organism is mentioned, and
often there may be multiple organisms or co-infections
capable of causing a particular disease. Not surprisingly,
this ambiguity poses a significant hurdle to communica-
tion among the diverse communities that must deal with
epidemics or bioterrorist attacks.
To facilitate comprehensive access to information on dis-
ease-causing organisms and toxins, we have developed a
database known as "The Microbial Rosetta Stone" that
uses a new data model and novel computational tools to
manage microbiological data [1,2]. This article focuses on
the information in the database for pathogens that impact
global public health, emerging infectious organisms, and
bioterrorist threat agents. It provides a compilation of
lists, taken from the database, of important and/or regu-
lated biological agents from a number of agencies includ-
ing HHS, the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), the CDC, the World Health Organization
(WHO), the NIAID, and other sources. We curated these
lists to include organism names that are consistent with
the National Center for Biotechnology Information
(NCBI) nomenclature and to provide sequence accession
numbers for genomic sequencing projects (if available).
Important synonyms or previously used names that iden-
tify the organisms are also shown. We have organized the
lists according to phylogenetic structure. This paper pro-
vides graphic representations of the phylogenetic related-
ness of important pathogenic organisms.
The goal of the database is to provide an informative,
readily accessible, single location for basic information on
a broad range of important disease causing agents. The
database will help users to avoid the pitfalls of confusing
nomenclature and taxonomic relationships and allow
access to literature on in-depth studies. The database can
be accessed at http://www.microbialrosettastone.com/.
Results
The Microbial Rosetta Stone database was designed to link
genomic sequence data, taxonomic classification, and epi-
demiological information in a way that facilitates searches
and data updates. The intent is not to replace currently
available tools, like those available from NCBI, but
instead serve to resolve ambiguities and data conflicts.
One of the main goals of building this informatics infra-
structure was to support the rapid determination of the
causative agent in the event of a bioterrorist action or
emergence of a previously unknown infectious disease.
This paper focuses on pathogenic organisms from several
broad categories. Those currently known to impact global
human health are monitored by a number of public
health organizations and United States governmental
agencies including the WHO [see Additional File 1] and
the CDC [see Additional File 2]. Important food and water
borne pathogens are listed in Additional File 3 [see Addi-
tional File 3]. Those agents responsible for emerging dis-
eases are listed in Additional File 4 [see Additional File 4].
Pathogens considered high priority by the NIAID are
listed in Additional File 5 [see Additional File 5]. Agents
are listed that pose a high threat for bioterrorism [see
Additional File 6], biocrimes [see Additional File 7], or
have a high potential to be genetically manipulated [see
Additional File 8]. Human pathogens formally regulated
by the HHS are listed in Additional File 9 [see Additional
File 9] and animal pathogens monitored by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) are listed in Addi-
tional File 10 [see Additional File 10].
The organisms listed in the Additional Files are repre-
sented according to phylogenetic hierarchy in the figures.
The symbols used in the figures connect the organism
names back to one or more of the Additional Files, which
allows visualization of the fact that organisms are often
represented in multiple Additional Files. Figure 1 is the
symbols key. Figures 2 and 3 show the phylogenetic rela-
tionships of cellular life forms including bacteria, fungi,
protozoa, and the plants and animals that produce toxins,
Figure 4 shows the phylogenetic relationships of DNA
viruses, and Figures 5, 6, and 7 show the phylogenetic
relationships of RNA viruses.
For optimal utility, the genomic sequence data, taxo-
nomic, and epidemiological information were linked in a
way that facilitates searches, data updates, and data cura-
tion. The Microbial Rosetta Stone system will serve as a
translator to resolve ambiguities and data conflicts
between other public databases and literature and, when
unable to resolve ambiguities, provide enough context for
users understand the nature of the ambiguities. The data-
base provides links to literature on experimental protocols
for pathogen identification and to the genomic and bio-
chemical information specific to a species, strain, or iso-
late. The data model and query tools are described in
detail in Hari et al. [1]. The following sections describe the
information and literature sources used to populate in the
database for globally important and emerging pathogens
and potential bioterrorist agents.BMC Microbiology 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/5/19
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Important public health pathogens
In the developing world, nearly 90% of infectious disease
deaths are due to six diseases or disease processes: acute
respiratory infections, diarrhea, tuberculosis, HIV, mea-
sles, and malaria [see Additional File 1] [3]. In both devel-
oping and developed nations, the leading cause of death
by a wide margin is acute respiratory disease [3-5]. In the
developing world, acute respiratory infections are attrib-
uted primarily to six bacteria: Bordetella pertussis, Strepto-
coccus pneumonia,  Haemophilus influenzae,  Staphylococcus
aureus, Mycoplasma pneumonia, Chlamydophila pneumonia,
and Chlamydia trachomatis [6]. These bacteria belong to
four different taxonomic classes and illustrate how similar
parasitic lifestyles can evolve in parallel within unrelated
bacterial species (Figure 2). Major viral causes of respira-
tory infections include respiratory syncytial virus (Figure
5), human parainfluenza viruses 1 and 3 (Figure 5), influ-
enza viruses A and B (Figure 5), as well as some adenovi-
ruses (Figure 4) [5,6].
The major causes of diarrhoeal disease in the developing
and developed world have significant differences due to
the great disparity of availability of pure food and water
and the general nutritional and health status of the popu-
lations. Important causes of diarrhoeal disease in the
developing world are those that tend to be epidemic, espe-
cially  Vibrio cholera,  Shigella dysenteriae, and Salmonella
typhi [7]. These organisms are gammaproteobacteria (Fig-
ure 2) that use many different metabolic pathways to
ensure their survival in a wide range of environments. In
the United States there is a much lower incidence of diar-
rhoeal disease overall, and a relatively greater impact of
direct human-to-human infectious transmission. The
most important causes of diarrhoeal disease in the United
States are bacteria such as Escherichia coli, Campylobacter
species, Clostridium difficile, Listeria monocytogenes, Salmo-
nella enteritidis, and Shigella  species (Figure 2); viruses,
such as Norwalk virus (Figure 6) and rotaviruses (Figure
7); and parasites such as Cryptosporidium parvum,
Cyclospora cayetanensis, Entamoeba histolytica, Giardia lam-
blia, while microsporidia are responsible for a smaller
number of cases (Figure 3).
Infectious disease agents important to the public health in
the U.S. are monitored by the CDC and listed in Addi-
tional File 2 [see Additional File 2]. There are no set crite-
ria for inclusion on the notifiable disease list; rather, the
list is created by the CDC in cooperation with state health
departments. As diseases occur less frequently and new
diseases emerge, the notifiable disease list changes. The
list provides links to case definitions of each disease,
including the etiological agent(s) responsible. In cases
where the etiological agent was not listed or was
Symbol key Figure 1
Symbol key. These symbols are used in the Figures 2 through 7 to link pathogen names to their originating Additional Files.
86'$+LJK&RQVHTXHQFH$QLPDO3DWKRJHQ
++66HOHFW$JHQW
86'$+LJK&RQVHTXHQFH3ODQW3DWKRJHQ
1,$,'&DWHJRU\$3ULRULW\3DWKRJHQ
1,$,'&DWHJRU\%3ULRULW\3DWKRJHQ
1,$,'&DWHJRU\&3ULRULW\3DWKRJHQ
9DOLGDWHG%LRORJLFDO:HDSRQ
3RWHQWLDO%LRORJLFDO:HDSRQ
9DOLGDWHG%LRFULPH$JHQW
*OREDOO\,PSRUWDQW+XPDQ3DWKRJHQ
0HGLFDOO\,PSRUWDQW+XPDQ3DWKRJHQ
+LJK3RWHQWLDO)RU%LRHQJLQHHULQJ
7R[LQ
=RRQRWLF$JHQW
&'&1RWLILDEOH$JHQW
&'&
3ULQFLSDO)RRGERUQH3DWKRJHQ
,PSRUWDQW$QLPDO3DWKRJHQ
,PSRUWDQW3ODQW3DWKRJHQ
(PHUJLQJ,QIHFWLRXV$JHQW BMC Microbiology 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/5/19
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Bacterial pathogens Figure 2
Bacterial pathogens. Bacterial phylogeny is based on work by Hugenholtz et al. [69]. Bacterial phyla are shown on the leaves, 
with the Firmicutes and the Proteobacteria subdivided to the class level (taxa are shown in italics). Their phylogeny is further 
broken down to the order level with the use of smaller branches. These two phyla account for roughly three quarters of the 
described infectious bacterial species (with the noticeable exception of deltaproteobacteria pathogens). Proteobacteria contain 
both important plant and animal pathogens. Proteobacterial plant pathogens are not clustered, but are observed in alpha, beta, 
and gamma subdivisions. Some plant and animal pathogen species share the same genus classification (e.g. Ralstonia and Pseu-
domonas), and for at least one species, Burkholderia cepacia, different subspecies are plant and human pathogens. Of the 20 bac-
terial phyla currently recognized in the NCBI taxonomy, thirteen are not present in Figure 2 due to the absence of noteworthy 
pathogens. Some of these missing phyla are relatively important, like the Cyanobacteria, but most of the remaining phyla are 
restricted to a handful of species and/or environmental niches. Also of interest is the relative weight of the infectious agents 
within their respective phylum: While virtually all Spirochaetes and Chlamydiae constitute potential infectious agents due to 
their parasitic lifestyle, the phylum Actinobacteria has few pathogens relative to the overall diversity of the phylum. It should be 
cautioned that our current view of bacterial diversity is biased towards cultivatable organisms, which represent a small fraction 
of bacterial diversity [69]. Therefore, this compilation represents the well-recognized infectious bacterial agents, but should in 
no way be considered exhaustive or complete.
&KODP\GLDH
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%DFWHURLGHWHV
6SLURFKHWHV
(SVLORQ
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$FLQHWREDFWHUFDOFRDFHWLFXV 
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0\FRSODVPDP\FRLGHV
0\FRSODVPDFDSULFROXP
VXEVS&DSULSQHXPRQLDH
0\FRSODVPDSQHXPRQLDH
(U\VLSHORWKUL[UKXVLRSDWKLDH
)XVREDFWHULXPQHFURSKRUXP
6WUHSWREDFLOOXVPRQLOLIRUPLV
&DPS\OREDFWHUIHWXV
+HOLFREDFWHUS\ORUL
&DPS\OREDFWHUMHMXQL 
&DPS\OREDFWHUFROL
&DPS\OREDFWHUK\RLQWHVWLQDOLV
&DPS\OREDFWHUODUL
&DPS\OREDFWHUXSVDOLHQVLV
(KUOLFKLDUXPLQDQWLXP
5LFNHWWVLDIHOLV
(KUOLFKLDFDQLV
&'&
(KUOLFKLDHZLQJLL
&'&
(KUOLFKLDFKDIIHHQVLV
&'&
1HRULFNHWWVLDVHQQHWVX
&'&
2ULHQWLDWVXWVXJDPXVKL
$QDSODVPDSKDJRF\WRSKLOXP
&'& 
5LFNHWWVLDFRQRULL 
5LFNHWWVLDSURZD]HNLL
5LFNHWWVLDULFNHWWVLL
&'&
5LFNHWWVLDW\SKL 
(LNHQHOODFRUURGHQV
1HLVVHULDJRQRUUKRHDH
&'&
1HLVVHULDPHQLQJLWLGLV
&'& 
6SLULOOXPPLQXV
&LWUREDFWHUIUHXQGLL
6KLJD7R[LQ
6DOPRQHOODSDUDW\SKL
6DOPRQHOODERQJRUL
.OHEVLHOODSQHXPRQLDH 
6DOPRQHOODW\SKLPXULXP 
&'&
<HUVLQLDHQWHURFROLWLFD 6HUUDWLDPDUFHVFHQV
6KLJHOODG\VHQWHULDH
&'&
6DOPRQHOODW\SKL
&'&
6DOPRQHOODHQWHULGLWLV 
&'&
6DOPRQHOODFKROHUDHVXLV
6KLJHOODER\GLL
&'&
6KLJHOODIOH[QHUL
&'&
6KLJHOODVRQQHL
&'&
)UDQFLVHOODWXODUHQVLV
&'& 
/LVWHULDPRQRF\WRJHQHV
&'&
/LVWHULDLYDQRYLL
/LVWHULDVHHOLJHUL
/LVWHULDZHOVKLPHUL
&RU\QHEDFWHULXPGLSKWKHULDH
&'& 
&RU\QHEDFWHULXPDP\FRODWXP 
&RU\QHEDFWHULXP[HURVLV 
&RU\QHEDFWHULXPMHLNHLXP
'LSKWKHULDWR[LQ
5KRGRFRFFXVHTXL 
1RFDUGLDQRYD
1RFDUGLDDVWHURLGHV
$FWLQRP\FHVQDHVOXQGLL
3URSLRQLEDFWHULXPDFQHV
$FWLQRP\FHVLVUDHOLL
5RWKLDGHQWRFDULRVD
&ODYLEDFWHUPLFKLJDQHQVLV
VXEVS6HSHGRQLFXV
/HJLRQHOODORQJEHDFKDH
/HJLRQHOODSQHXPRSKLOD
&'& 
7DWORFNLDPLFGDGHL 
&R[LHOODEXUQHWWL
&'&
%RUGHWHOODSHUWXVVLV
&'& 
5DOVWRQLDPDQQLWROLO\WLFD 
5DOVWRQLDSLFNHWWLL 
5DOVWRQLDVRODQDFHDUXP
%XUNKROGHULDFHSDFLD 
%XUNKROGHULDPDOOHL
%XUNKROGHULDSVHXGRPDOOHL 
(VFKHULFKLDFROL
&'& 
9LEULRFKROHUDH
&'&
<HUVLQLDSVHXGRWXEHUFXORVLV
<HUVLQLDSHVWLV
&'&
%DFLOOXVVXEWLOLV
%DFLOOXVFHUHXV 
%DFLOOXVDQWKUDFLV
&'&
(QWHURWR[LQ%
(QWHURWR[LQ$
6WDSK\ORFRFFXVFRDJXODVHQHJDWLYH
6WDSK\ORFRFFXVKDHPRO\WLFXV
6WDSK\ORFRFFXVHSLGHUPLGLV
6WDSK\ORFRFFXVLQWHUPHGLXV
6WDSK\ORFRFFXVVDSURSK\WLFXV
6WDSK\ORFRFFXVDXUHXV

&'&
%RUUHOLDUHFXUUHQWLV
7UHSRQHPDSDOOLGXP
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%RUUHOLDKHUPVLL
%RUUHOLDWXULFDWDH
/HSWRVSLUDLQWHUURJDQV
%RUUHOLDEXUJGRUIHUL 
&'&



$JUREDFWHULXPWXPHIDFLHQV
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%DUWRQHOODKHQVHODH 
%DUWRQHOODTXLQWDQD 
%UXFHOODPHOLWHQVLVELRYDU&DQLV 
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%UXFHOODPHOLWHQVLV
&'& 
%UXFHOODPHOLWHQVLVELRYDU$ERUWXV
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%UXFHOODPHOLWHQVLVELRYDU6XLV
&'& BMC Microbiology 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/5/19
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unspecific (i.e. Brucella spp.), further research was done to
determine an etiological agent and this information is in
Additional File 2 [see Additional File 2].
Food-borne pathogens
Each year in the United States, there are approximately 76
million cases of food-borne illness, including 325,000
hospitalizations and 5,000 deaths [8,9]. In an estimated 2
to 3% of these cases, chronic sequelae develop. These
sequelae include renal disease, cardiovascular diseases,
gastrointestinal disorders, neural disorders, and autoim-
mune disease [10]. The estimated cost of food-borne ill-
ness in the United States is $23 billion annually [8].
Mishandling of food is believed to be responsible for 85%
of all outbreaks of food-borne disease in developed
nations, primarily due to a lack of education [8,11-13].
Food-borne pathogens [see Additional File 3] are also
important because they represent one of the largest
sources of emerging antibiotic-resistant pathogens. This is
due in part to the administration of sub-therapeutic doses
of antibiotics to food-producing animals to enhance
growth. For example, certain strains of Salmonella show
Eukaryotic pathogens Figure 3
Eukaryotic pathogens. Eukaryotic pathogen life forms are clearly dominated by the fungi and protists. Within the Fungi, the 
phylum Ascomycota has many human, animal, and plant pathogens and is a major source of toxins. Protist species are respon-
sible for globally important diseases such as the malaria-causing Plasmodium species and the Leishmania and Trypanosoma species 
that cause significant mortality in the developing world. The eukaryotic phylogeny tree is based on ribosomal and housekeeping 
gene sequence analysis [70], but different taxonomy levels are simultaneously represented as the topology has not yet been 
reliably determined.
Euglenoids
Heterolobosea
Diplomonads
Alveolata
Lobosea
Metazoa
Entamoebidae
Acanthamoebidae
Stramenopiles
Apicomplexa
Dinoflagellates
Fungi
Chytridiomycota
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             Saxitoxin
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             Saxitoxin
Pyrodinium bahamense
             Saxitoxin
Naegleria fowleri !
3QHXPRF\VWLVMLURYHFLL !
Absidia corymbifera
Mucor circinelloides
Rhizopus oryzae
Balamuthia mandrillaris
Peronosclerospora philippinensis
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Blastocystis hominis
$MHOORP\FHVFDSVXODWXV !
+LVWRSODVPDFDSVXODWXPYDUGXERLVLL !
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CDC !
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Aspergillus fumigatus
Aspergillus niger
Aflatoxin
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Candida spp. !
Entamoeba histolytica
Giardia intestinalis
CDC !
Acanthamoeba polyphaga !
Acanthamoeba castellanii !
Sporothrix schenkii
1HFWULDKDHPDWRFRFFD
Fusarium oxysporum !
)XVDULXPVRODQL !
Gibberella zeae
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Diacetoxyscirpenol
T-2 Toxin
Filobasidiella neoformans !
Phakopsora pachyrhizi
Tilletia indica
Ustilago tritici
Enterocytozoon bieneusi !
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CDC
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resistance to eight or more antibiotics [14]. Studies have
shown that antibiotic resistance in Salmonella cannot be
traced to antibiotic use in humans, suggesting that antibi-
otic use in animals is the primary cause of resistance [15].
While much is known about the major microbes respon-
sible for diseases, there are still many undiagnosed cases
of infectious disease. It has been estimated that as many as
three-fifths of the deaths from acute gastroenteritis per
year in the United States are caused by an infectious
organism of unknown etiology [16]. Four of the major
causes of food-borne infections (Campylobacter jejuni,
Escherichia coli O157:H7,  Listeria monocytogenes, and
Cyclospora cayetanensis, Figure 2) were only recently recog-
nized as causes of food-borne illness [16].
Emerging infectious disease
Diseases that have recently appeared or that are growing
in incidence are classified as emerging infectious diseases
[see Additional File 4]. Emerging infectious organisms
often encounter hosts with no prior exposure and thus
represent a novel challenge to the host's immune system.
Morse [17] identified six general factors in emergence of
infectious disease: ecological changes, human demo-
graphics and behavior, international travel, technology
and industry, microbial adaptation and change, and
breakdown in public health measures. A comprehensive
review by Taylor, Latham, and Woolhouse [18] identified
zoonotic status as one of the strongest risk factors for dis-
ease emergence. Roughly 75% of emerging pathogens are
DNA viruses Figure 4
DNA viruses. The relationships for large genome DNA viruses on this chart was derived from the work of Iyer, Aravind & 
Koonin, who showed the common ancestry of four large DNA virus families [72]. Noteworthy in this figure are the number of 
viruses that may be readily bioengineered.
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zoonotic, and zoonoses are twice as likely to be consid-
ered emerging as non-zoonoses.
Zoonoses are a special class of pathogens as they co-evolve
with the reservoir host, not with humans. Although not
always the case, when zoonotic pathogens infect humans
they have a tendency to cause severe disease, much like a
commensal microorganism that infects unusual areas of
the body [19]. Zoonoses can be broken down into two
basic groups: those spread by direct contact with the
infected animal and those spread via an intermediate vec-
tor [20]. Zoonoses can infect humans through many
vectors. Members of the genus Hantavirus are spread by
rats [21], West Nile virus by mosquitoes [22], and Campy-
lobacter species by family pets [23]. In 2003, there was an
outbreak of monkeypox (Figure 4) in the Midwestern
United States, which was attributed to the importation of
pet animals [24]. Viruses, protozoa, and bacteria can all be
transmitted either directly or via a vector. However, these
groups are clearly differentiated on a phylogenetic level.
Single-stranded negative strand RNA viruses Figure 5
Single-stranded negative strand RNA viruses. The common origin of RNA viruses and their tentative relationships as 
indicated on this chart are based on an extensive analysis of their RNA-dependent RNA- or DNA-polymerases (C.M. manu-
script in preparation). The branching of double-stranded RNA viruses is unresolved in light of their apparent polyphyly [73]. 
Virtually all known branches of ssRNA(-) viruses harbor pathogens and thus are represented in this panel. Only the rhabdoviri-
dae family harbors both animal and plant pathogens. Particularly noteworthy are the deadly Ebola and Influenza viruses, the lat-
ter has claimed tens of millions of human lives in the past century.
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All zoonotic members of the families Flaviviridae  and
Togaviridae (Figure 6) are transmitted via an intermediate
vector, while all zoonotic members of the families Arena-
viridae,  Paramyxoviridae, and Filoviridae  (Figure 5) are
transmitted through direct contact. Almost all zoonotic
proteobacteria are transmitted through direct contact as
well [20]. Of all the agents infectious to humans, a major-
ity are zoonotic in origin [18].
Several viruses responsible for human epidemics have
made a transition from animal host to human host and
are now transmitted from human to human. Human
immunodeficiency virus (Figure 7), responsible for the
AIDS epidemic, is one example [25]. Although it has yet
to be proven, it is suspected that severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS), caused by the SARS coronavirus (Figure
6), also resulted from a species jump [26]. For many years,
Robert G. Webster has studied the importance of
influenza viruses in wild birds as a major reservoir of
influenza viruses and has clarified their role in the evolu-
tion of pandemic strains that infect humans and lower
animals [27].
Intriguingly, it appears that whenever a virus (or any other
pathogen or pest) is eradicated another appears to fill the
environmental niche. For example, in regions where the
wild-type poliovirus (Figure 6) has been eliminated, non-
polio enteroviruses have been associated with outbreaks
Single-stranded positive strand RNA viruses Figure 6
Single-stranded positive strand RNA viruses. The Togaviridae and Flaviviridae, and to a lesser extent the Coronaviridae and 
Picornaviridae, families are the most prominent human pathogens. Important plant viruses affect major cereal grains causing 
severe crop damages worldwide and affecting the nutrition of entire populations.
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of paralytic disease that clinically exhibit symptoms of
poliomyelitis. The most common non-polio enteroviral
causes of Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) are human cox-
sackieviruses A7 and A9 and human enterovirus 71 (Fig-
ure 6). The poliovirus epidemics that emerged in the mid
19th century are now believed to have arisen not due to a
change in the properties of the virus, but due to an
improvement of public sanitation and personal hygiene,
which delayed the acquisition of enteric virus infection
from infancy to childhood. Since maternal antibodies
protected infants, they usually underwent silent immuniz-
ing infections, whereas when older children were infected
they more often suffered paralytic poliomyelitis [28].
Economically important plant and animal pathogens
Proteobacteria are important plant and animal patho-
gens, and it is interesting that proteobacterial plant path-
ogens are not clustered on the phylogenetic tree, but are
observed in alpha, beta, and gamma subdivisions (Figure
2). Some plant and animal pathogen species share the
same genus classification (e.g. Ralstonia and Pseudomonas),
and for at least one species, Burkholderia cepacia, different
subspecies are plant and human pathogens. In viruses,
plant and animal pathogens are generally found in dis-
tinct families, with the notable exception of the families
Rhabdoviridae  (Figure 5) and Reoviridae  (Figure 7) that
harbor both. Most plant-specific virus families are not
shown in Figures 4,5,6,7, but for rice alone at least ten
Retroid viruses and double-stranded RNA viruses Figure 7
Retroid viruses and double-stranded RNA viruses. The most prominent include the two HIV viruses and the Hepatitis B 
virus, and the main family of double-stranded RNA viruses, the Orbiviridae. The latter family is an example of a virus family that 
includes both animal and plant pathogens. The plant pathogens primarily infect rice cultures.
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unrelated virus species have been reported to infect cul-
tures worldwide. The overall economical effect of plant
pathogens has been estimated to reduce crop production
by one fifth [29]. Foot-and-mouth disease almost
destroyed the beef industry in the United Kingdom and
losses were very high. Bird flu in South East Asia affected
the poultry industry severely. Influenza A is a bird virus
that jumped from birds via pigs to humans and as a
human pathogen has a large impact on the economy [30].
Bioterrorism and biocrimes
Bioterrorism can be defined as an attack or threat of an
attack using bioweapons on humans and/or their assets to
create fear, to intimidate, to inflict harm, and/or affect
economic well being. Such acts may be motivated by
political, religious, ecological, or other ideological objec-
tives. Any microorganism or toxin capable of causing
disease or harm in humans, plants, or animals has the
potential for illicit use and thus the list of potential agents
could be vast. However, not all organisms or toxins make
useful biological weapons. Displaying biological weapons
from a phylogenetic perspective provides insight into how
organisms that have been historically used as biowarfare
agents are related to important human and agricultural
pathogens and also provides insight into other similar
organisms that might be considered as weapons in the
future. The properties that make organisms amenable for
use as biological weapons have been discussed extensively
[31-39]. The most important features include: 1) accessi-
bility; 2) consistent ability to cause death or disability; 3)
culturability; 4) possibility for large scale production; 5)
stability and ability to retain potency during transport and
storage; 6) delivery potential; 7) stability and retention of
potency after dissemination; and 8) infectivity and toxic-
ity [39].
The infectious agents considered by the NIAID to have
high potential for bioterror use are listed in Additional
File 5 [see Additional File 5]. Validated and potential bio-
weapons agents are listed in Additional File 6 [see Addi-
tional File 6]. Agents that have been used to commit
biocrimes [2] are in Additional File 7 [see Additional File
7]. The pathogens regulated by the HHS and the USDA are
shown in Additional File 9 [see Additional File 9] and
Additional file 10 [see Additional File 10], respectively. In
addition to infectious microbes, toxins derived from bio-
logical sources are contained on these lists. We identified
the biological source of each toxin, and listed the source
organism in the Additional File containing the toxin.
All 11 regulated toxins can be found on the HHS Select
Agent list [see Additional File 9] and five are also regulated
by the USDA [see Additional File 10]. The regulated toxins
(four small molecules and seven peptides or proteins) are
produced by a wide variety of organisms: five are pro-
duced by bacteria [40-42], two by fungi [43,44], two by
plants [45,46], one by an animal [47], and one by a protist
[48]. The bacteria that produce toxins are indicated in Fig-
ure 2 and the eukaryotic toxin producers are shown in Fig-
ure 3. The conotoxins are a collection of five families of
related peptide toxins produced by the various species of
snails in the genus Conus [47]. The two fungal toxins,
diacetoxyscirpenol and T-2 toxin, are produced by multi-
ple species of the genus Fusarium [43,44]. Of the five reg-
ulated bacterial toxins, four are peptides or proteins and
tetrodotoxin [49] is a small molecule. Tetrodotoxin is pro-
duced by a variety of gammaproteobacteria that colonize
the puffer fish [50]. These toxins are relevant both due to
concern that they may cause outbreaks of disease through
accidental food contamination and because they are
potential bioweapons. According to the CDC [51], an
average of 110 cases of botulism, caused by a bacterial
toxin (Figure 2), are reported each year. Interestingly,
numbers of cases of food-borne and infant botulism have
not changed significantly in recent years, but instances of
wound-botulism have increased primarily due to the use
of black-tar heroin, especially in California. Ricin is a
toxin produced by the plant Ricinus communis (Figure 3)
[46]. When prepared as a weapon, there are three methods
of delivery: ingestion, injection, or inhalation [41]. One of
the most famous documented uses of ricin was in the
assassination of Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian defector who
died three days after being shot with a ricin pellet [41,52].
Organisms with high potential for genetic engineering
Pathogens that can be genetically manipulated [see Addi-
tional File 8] represent a unique bioterrorist threat, partic-
ularly as technology to genetically alter microbes becomes
more commonplace. For the purposes of this work,
viruses considered as having a high potential danger for
bioterrorist engineering were derived from the literature
reports and from the authors' judgment balancing the
considerations of terror potential with the technical diffi-
culty of use.
DNA viruses (Figure 4) with large genomes can be manip-
ulated in culture, and are susceptible to engineering
events such as insertion of genes not normally present in
viral genomes. For example, the entire orthopoxvirus
genus of the poxvirus family is considered to have high
potential for bioengineering because of a much-publi-
cized paper that describes the engineering of an orthopox
member, ectromelia virus, to express mouse interleukin-4,
resulting in a virus with extraordinary virulence [53].
Another member of the orthopoxvirus genus, vaccinia
virus, is commonly used in molecular biology research
and is extensively used in vaccines and vaccine research
[54-57]. Thus, because they are highly infectious, will tol-
erate inserted genes, and can be manipulated easily in cul-
ture, poxviruses must be considered high-risk agents forBMC Microbiology 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/5/19
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acts of bioengineering. Mutations to create vaccine- and
drug-resistant strains are also possible in other large-
genome DNA viruses. Adeno-associated viruses are small
DNA viruses that are members of the family Parvoviridae.
They are satellite viruses that depend upon the presence of
their helper DNA viruses, including members of the fam-
ilies Adenoviridae and Herpesviridae, for replication. Like
vaccinia virus, adeno-associated viruses have been used
extensively as vectors for gene therapy, and therefore
represent a risk for genetic modification and subsequent
terrorist use.
RNA-genome viruses are naturally more resistant to inser-
tion of genes, but can be made resistant to drugs and
potentially even to vaccines by introduction of mutations.
Most critically, RNA viruses may be created in the labora-
tory by total chemical synthesis to generate active virus
particles or reconstituted from cloned DNA. Total chemi-
cal synthesis was demonstrated recently for poliovirus
(Figure 6) [58]. Since this publication in 2002, the tech-
nology to chemically synthesize viruses has advanced
substantially. Chemical synthesis of RNA viruses would
eliminate the need for the bioterrorist to obtain stock cul-
tures and would allow creation of any wild-type or mutant
strain of virtually any virus. Other positive-strand RNA
viruses (Figure 6) that have been reconstituted from
cloned DNA samples include Kunjin virus [59], human
rhinovirus [60], foot-and-mouth disease virus [61], trans-
missible gastroenteritis virus, a coronavirus [62,63], all
three genera of the family Flaviviridae [64], and a variety of
plant and insect viruses [65,66]. Thus, the positive-
stranded viruses must be considered a high-risk area for
bioengineering, where the relative risk for each virus must
be considered roughly equivalent to the terrorist potential
inherent to the virus.
Negative-strand RNA viruses (Figure 5) can also be recon-
stituted by total chemical synthesis or from cloned
genomic DNA by a reverse genetics approach [67]. Many
negative-strand RNA viruses, including ebolaviruses, Lake
Victoria marburgvirus, Hantaan virus and Lassa virus, are
important human pathogens and potential bioterrorist
agents. Influenza virus A is a particularly noteworthy neg-
ative-strand RNA virus due to its potential to cause pan-
demic disease, the availability of stock cultures of many
strains, and the potential for total chemical synthesis by
reverse genetics techniques [68].
For bacteria, if virulence factors have previously been
modified successfully in a species, that species was consid-
ered to have a high potential for bioengineering and was
included on the chart. However, numerous other meth-
ods for engineering bacterial genomes exist. Bacterial
genomes consist of one or more chromosomes and addi-
tional genetic information may exist in the form of plas-
mids. Plasmids replicate independently of the
chromosomal DNA and can be transferred between bacte-
ria through transformation. Genes encoding virulence fac-
tors may be found in either chromosomes or plasmids. In
one example of an early bioengineering event, the selec-
tive growth of an antibiotic-sensitive species with an anti-
biotic-resistant species in the presence of the antibiotic
resulted in transference of resistance. Current techniques
allow for the splicing of genes encoding virulence factors
from one species followed by insertion into another.
However, the complexity of the bacterial genome makes it
difficult to successfully transfer a gene with a high rate of
expression.
Conclusion
This manuscript provides a visualization of the results
obtained from use of the Microbial Rosetta Stone Data-
base, a database that uses a new data model and novel
computational tools to synthesize information on impor-
tant human, animal, and plant pathogens [1]. Informa-
tion on critical pathogens and diseases has been collected
from many sources. Organism names from all lists were
converted to NCBI species names and diseases were linked
to particular pathogens, which facilitated computational
analysis and linkage to public genomic databases. This
database should facilitate access to information on dis-
ease-causing organisms and toxins. The database can be
accessed at http://www.microbialrosettastone.com/.
Methods
Agent lists were collected from various sources as
described in more detail for each Additional File below.
Government agency lists (Additional Files 1, 2, 5, 9, and
10) were taken directly from the specified agencies, while
additional tables were compiled using cited literature.
Organism names from all lists were converted to NCBI
species names. This included changes from species syno-
nyms to NCBI-accepted nomenclature and expansion
from Genus to Genus species (e.g. Shigella to Shigella dysente-
riae or Shigella sonnei) to represent the most important
species (when known). Where possible, disease names
were associated with the name of the most predominant
organism that causes the disease. The Additional Files
contain taxonomic information, the NCBI name of the
agent and any well-known synonyms, and accession num-
bers for the complete genome of each agent (if available).
Names of the infectious agents listed in the Additional
Files were placed in tree-structure drawings shown in the
figures that display the biological relatedness of the organ-
isms. Cellular life forms were organized according to cur-
rently accepted phylogenetic relationships. Bacterial
phylogeny (Figure 2) is based on work by Hugenholtz et
al. [69]. The eukaryotic phylogeny tree (Figure 3) is based
on ribosomal and housekeeping gene sequence analysisBMC Microbiology 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/5/19
Page 12 of 17
(page number not for citation purposes)
[70]. The branching order presented in Figure 3 should be
considered tentative as the on-going recognition of addi-
tional protist lineages is likely to alter the topology of the
eukaryotic tree in the near future [71]. The phylogeny of
DNA viruses (Figure 4) was derived primarily from the
work of Iyer, Aravind & Koonin [72]. The common origin
of RNA viruses and their tentative relationships (Figures
5,6,7) is based on an extensive analysis of their RNA-
dependent RNA- or DNA-polymerase (manuscript in
preparation). The RNA virus phylogenetic trees were cre-
ated using maximum parsimony on protein sequences.
The branching of double-stranded RNA viruses is for now
left unresolved in light of their apparent polyphyly [73].
The symbol key is shown in Figure 1 and symbols are used
in the other figures to link the pathogens in the figures to
Additional Files.
The agents listed in Additional File 1 [see Additional File
1] were taken from a list maintained by the WHO. The
WHO tracks the occurrence of morbidity and mortality of
global infectious diseases. Because of the great disparity in
infectious disease prevalence between developed and
developing nations, the WHO divides the world into
demographically developed nations (including the
United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, and nations of the
former Soviet Union) and demographically developing
nations (including India, China, other Asian nations,
Pacific island nations, Africa, Latin America, and the Mid-
dle East) [3]. The WHO lists leading causes of death
worldwide by disease categories. The disease can be
caused by multiple diverse organisms or co-infections of
different organisms, as is the case for acute respiratory dis-
ease, or by specific organisms, such as acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or tuberculosis. In the former
case, we identified the most prominent organisms respon-
sible for the disease for display in Additional File 1.
The CDC-notifiable-disease list represents those diseases
that offer the greatest threat to public health in the United
States. Additional File 2 [see Additional File 2] lists the
agents on this list. There are no set criteria for inclusion on
the notifiable disease list; rather, the list is created by the
CDC in cooperation with state health departments. As dis-
eases occur less frequently and new diseases emerge, the
notifiable disease list changes. An up-to-date version of
the list can be found online on the CDC website [74]. The
online list provides links to case definitions of each
disease, including the etiological agent(s) responsible. In
cases where the etiological agent was not listed or was
unspecific (i.e. Brucella species), further research was done
to determine an etiological agent and literature used is
cited in legend for Additional File 2.
The most common causative agents of food- and water-
borne illness were taken from a publication by Tauxe [75]
and are listed in Additional File 3 [see Additional File 3].
Hubálek [20] published a list that constitutes a represent-
ative subset of emerging infectious diseases, which was
used as the basis for Additional File 4 [see Additional File
4]. The complete list of all species classified as emerging is
substantial [18,76]. The number of pathogens listed in the
emerging disease table at http://www.microbialrosettas
tone.com/ is significantly larger than that found in Addi-
tional File 4.
Additional File 5 [see Additional File 5]was taken from
The NIAID Strategic Plan For Biodefense Research, which
lists agents with potential for "high morbidity and mortal-
ity; potential for person-to-person transmission, directly
or by vector; low infective dose and high infectivity by aer-
osol, with commensurate ability to cause large outbreaks;
ability to contaminate food and water supplies; lack of a
specific diagnostic test and/or effective treatment; lack of
a safe and effective vaccine; potential to cause anxiety in
the public and in health care workers; and the potential to
be weaponized [77]."
The properties that make organisms amenable for use as
biological weapons have been discussed extensively
[31,32]. For the purposes of the database, we have catego-
rized microorganisms or toxins as validated bioweapons if
they have been documented as used, or prepared for use,
as biological weapons [78]. Potential bioweapons are
defined as agents that have some properties that are con-
sidered useful as bioweapons or agents for terrorism, or
that have been the subject of serious bioweapons research
and development [31,39]. Greenwood et al. used a hierar-
chical ranking of 50 infectious agents and toxins of bio-
logical origin [31] to classify agents as potentially useful
biological weapons. Greenwood et al.'s 23 highest scoring
agents overlapped substantially with our list of validated
bioweapons and these are shown in Additional File 6 [see
Additional File 6].
The agents listed in Additional File 6 and additional
agents listed in Additional File 7 [see Additional File 7]
could be used in commission of a biocrime. Biocrimes are
similar to traditional crimes that harm specific individuals
except that the weapon is biological in nature. A number
of biological agents have been used to commit biocrimes
[52,79-96], and the potential list of agents that can be
used is enormous. Indeed, it is impossible to anticipate
the next organism that will be used for illicit purposes.
Documented cases and accessibility were the criteria for
choice of agents in Additional File 7.
The high potential for bioengineering category [see Addi-
tional File 8] includes both organisms that have been
actually modified in biological weapons research pro-
grams in the past, and organisms with properties thatBMC Microbiology 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/5/19
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make them amenable to future engineering. Placement in
the latter category was based upon published reports of
bioengineering for peaceful purposes [53-58] and the
author's (DJE) analysis. The agents on the HHS list are
shown in Additional File 9. HHS regulates the possession
of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to
pose a severe threat to public health and safety. HHS's
Select Agent Program [97] regularly reviews and updates
the list of select agents and critical human pathogens [98].
The USDA is required by federal law to protect animal and
plant health. High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and
Toxins are agents that the USDA considers to have the
potential to pose a severe threat to animal or plant health,
or to animal or plant products [99]. These organisms are
listed in Additional File 10 [see Additional File 10]. The
pathogens on the HHS [see Additional File 9] and USDA
lists include agents that span all domains of life, including
20 bacteria, 48 viruses, four fungi, two protists, one prion,
and 11 toxins. A significant number of these agents appear
on both the HHS and USDA lists.
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Additional material
Additional File 1
Globally important human pathogens. Pathogens are indicated on 
the phylogenetic charts when they cause at least 0.3 or more deaths per 
year per hundred thousand population in either developed or developing 
nations according to WHO estimates for the year 2,000. Medically impor-
tant organism cause fewer deaths than this threshold, but are considered 
important agents in western medicine [3,100-104].
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-
2180-5-19-S1.pdf]
Additional File 2
CDC notifiable agents. Literature used in conversion of disease names 
to pathogen responsible included: [105-116].
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-
2180-5-19-S2.pdf]
Additional File 3
Food-borne pathogens. Pathogens are represented on the phylogenetic 
charts if they cause more than 1000 cases of food-borne illness per year, 
estimated for 1997. Literature used in population of this table included: 
[16,113,114,117-119].
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-
2180-5-19-S3.pdf]
Additional File 4
Organisms responsible for emerging infectious diseases. Litera-
ture used in conversion of disease names to pathogen responsible and in 
population of the table included: [9,18,20,76,106-108,112,116,120-
138].
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-
2180-5-19-S4.pdf]
Additional File 5
NIAID priority pathogens. Literature used in population of the table 
included: [108,114,117,139,140].
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-
2180-5-19-S5.pdf]
Additional File 6
Validated and potential biological weapons. Literature used in pop-
ulation of the table included: [31,39,114,141-144].
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-
2180-5-19-S6.pdf]
Additional File 7
Validated and potential biocrimes weapons. Literature used in pop-
ulation of the table included: [52,79-96].
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-
2180-5-19-S7.pdf]
Additional File 8
Agents highly amenable to biological engineering. Literature used 
in population of this table included: [53-58].
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-
2180-5-19-S8.pdf]
Additional File 9
HHS Select Agents. Literature used in population of the table included: 
[145-147].
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-
2180-5-19-S9.pdf]
Additional File 10
USDA high consequence pathogens [PDF]. Literature used in popu-
lation of the table included: [146,148].
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-
2180-5-19-S10.pdf]BMC Microbiology 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/5/19
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